Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities: Towards a general theory of expectational coordination? by Guesnerie, Roger
Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic
complementarities: Towards a general theory of
expectational coordination?
Roger Guesnerie
To cite this version:
Roger Guesnerie. Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities: Towards a
general theory of expectational coordination?. PSE Working Papers n2005-07. 2005. <halshs-
00590856>
HAL Id: halshs-00590856
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00590856
Submitted on 5 May 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TEL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2005 - 07 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Substitutabilities versus Strategic  
Complementarities: Towards a General Theory  
of Expectational Coordination? 
 
 
Roger Guesnerie 
 
 Codes JEL :  
 
 Mots clés : 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
Strategic Substitutabilities versus Strategic
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of Expectational Coordination?
R. Guesnerie, Paris Jourdan et Collège de France
March 21, 2005
Abstract: This paper contrasts the views of expectational coordination
in a stylised economic model under two polar assumptions: Strategic Comple-
mentarities (StCo) dominate or on the contrary are dominated by Strategic
Substitutabilities (StSu). Although in the StCo case, ’uniqueness’ often ’buys’
’eductive stability’, the two issues are strikingly diﬀerent in the second case.
Furthermore if, in the first case, incomplete information often improves ’ex-
pectational coordination’, it may have the converse eﬀect in the StSu case. It
is finally argued that, in macroeconomic contexts, StSu often unambiguously
dominate StCo, even in a large class of models with Keynesian features, and
even in an aggregate framework that magnifies the StCo eﬀects. The ’remains’
of StCo in general cases are discussed.
Résumé : Cet article compare l’analyse de la stabilité des anticipations
dans un modèle économique stylisé dans deux cas polaires : Les Complémen-
tarités Stratégiques (CoSt) dominent ou sont dominées par les Substituabilités
Stratégiques (SuSt). Alors que, dans le premier cas, l’unicité va souvent de pair
avec la ”stabilité divinatoire”, les deux questions sont largement indépendantes
sous SuSt. Qui plus est, l’information incomplète, qui souvent contribue pos-
itivement à la coordination sous hypothèse de SuSt, a souvent l’eﬀet inverse
sous CoSt. Enfin, l’examen d’une classe de modèles macroéconomiques, même
dans un cadre agrégé qui amplifie les CoSt, et même sous des hypothèses néo-
keynésiennes, suggère que les SuSt y dominent les CoSt. Les ”vestiges” des CoSt
subsistant cependant dans les modèles désagrégés sont finalement discutés.
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1 Introduction1
For a time, economic theory was tempted to view expectations as fixed data
(this is the view taken in the so-called ’temporary equilibrium’ literature, where
expectations, like preferences, are unexplained) or moving data (adaptive ex-
pectations), but in both cases as partly exogenous data. The Rational Ex-
pectations Hypothesis, which has become dominant in formal economic theory,
views expectations as endogenous: expectations, conforming the predictions of
the so-called ’relevant economic theory’, tend to be ’self-fulfilling’. Although
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis has brought a major and fruitful concep-
tual breakthrough in the way we think about expectations, only zealots of the
Hypothesis would believe that the problem of expectational coordination has
disappeared from the agenda of economic theory. Indeed, the title of this con-
ference, ’Coordination failures’, where coordination, if I infer from the program,
refers mainly to expectational coordination, echoes this remark.
When and why expectational coordination succeeds or fails (success or failure
being associated with conformity to, or divergence from, the rational expecta-
tions predictions)? In order to think about this problem, a line of reflection,
broadly represented in the program of the conference, has attracted a lot of
attention and produced a number of related and consistent results that have
generated a clear advance in our understanding. This line of research has ex-
ploited successfully the analytical regularities generated by a certain type of
assumptions concerning economic interactions, the so-called Strategic Comple-
mentarities (from now on, StCo) assumptions (a subject pioneered by Topkis,
1979). Early influential contributions are associated with the names of Cooper
and John (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990). Carlsson and
Van Damme (1993) have introduced new ideas on the role of incomplete infor-
mation in StCo contexts, that will be scrutinized later.2
The reflection on expectational coordination is however far from been con-
fined to the Strategic Complementarities literature. As an example, my own
main subjects of interest over the last twenty years, endogenous fluctuations
and ’eductive stability’ of expectations,3 designate two diﬀerent lines of attack
1This article is based on my talk at the Conference Cofail (Coordination Failures) held at
Nanterre in june 2004. I thank the discussant Patrick Pintus, and Antoine d’Autume, Jean-
Charles Rochet and Olivier Tercieux for their useful remarks on a preliminary version. My
understanding of the issues has greatly benefited from conversation with Christophe Chamley
within the framework of a 2004 EHESS seminar that we jointly organised. I am also grateful
to Steve Morris who found the analysis of noisy strategic susbstitutabilities intriguing. The
computations he then undertook with Hyun Song Shin (personal correspondence : "notes on
strategic substitutes and complements in global games" (January 2005)) indeed support and
shed additional light on the argument of Section 4-2. Finally, I am particularly indebted to
Christian Bidard who made many suggestions : most of them have been implemented and
have improved the text. I remain responsible of any shortcomings.
2These ideas have been exploited in economic contexts by (without claim to exhaustivity)
Morris-Shin (1998), Morris (2000), Chamley (1999), Frankel-Pauzner (2000) and Rochet-Vives
(2003).
3A number of papers I authored or co-authored are reproduced in Assessing Rational
Expectations (MIT Press), which has two volumes with subtitles: Sunspot Multiplicity and
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for understanding expectational coordination. The present paper is particu-
larly concerned with the last line of research, that relative to ’eductive stability’
or, to follow my previous terminology on the topic, ’strong rationality’ (Gues-
nerie, 1988, 1992; this terminology is adopted in my work with co-authors: for
example, Desgranges-Geoﬀard-Guesnerie, 2003, Evans-Guesnerie, 1993, 2003,
Guesnerie-Rochet, 1992).4
These two lines of research, let us call them strategic complementarities and
eductive stability, have common references, such as iterated dominance.5 They
superficially exploit similar types of argument, based on ’eductive reasoning’,
and refer to Common Knowledge (from now on CK) considerations. However,
and quite surprisingly, they seem to have few connections. When comparing the
two approaches, one might argue that the first evokes a highway whereas the
second is rather a mountain trail. The comfort of the highway benefits from the
power and generality of well developed analytical tools in situations where they
are appropriate. The diversity of situations met in the second line of research
requires, like strolling on a mountain trail, hesitating and winding approaches,
and stresses solutions of doubtful universality. However, the experience from
the mountain trail that will be described later suggests that, if the view of the
landscape from the highway is neater and more organized, it concerns a small
part of the whole landscape.
The purpose of the present paper is to give some content to the above image
by revisiting the connections of the two lines of approach. The ordered landscape
that the dominance of strategic complementarities allows us to discover will be
first appraised (Section 2): the emphasis will successively be put on the connec-
tions that StCo establish between uniqueness and expectational stability and,
then, on the now well established role of incomplete information in triggering
both properties. This may shed some light on why the first one has developed
in a rather autonomous way.
When strategic substitutabilities dominate (Section 3), the previous two mes-
sages are basically aﬀected: uniqueness and expectational stability as assessed
through the ’eductive stability’ criterion evoked above are distinct properties;
and incomplete information is no longer a powerful deus ex machina for the
analysis of expectational stability (Section 4).
Finally (Section 5), it will be argued by means of examples that in many
macroeconomic contexts, strategic substitutabilities tend to dominate strategic
complementarites. The ’remains’ of strategic complementarities in the expla-
nation of expectational coordination will be discussed.
Economic Fluctuations (2001) and Eductive Stability in Economics (2005).
4Contributions along similar lines includes Borgers (1992), Dekel-Wolinsky (2003), Des-
granges (1999), Heinemann F. (1995), Heinemann M. (2002) and Gauthier (2003).
5The game-theoretical ideas of ’iterative dominance’ are already present in Luce-Raiﬀa
(1957). Early economic applications are found in Gabay-Moulin (1980) and Bernheim (1984).
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2 Strategic Complementarities
2.1 The grammar of the argument
The framework considered here is rather specific, when compared to an abstract
game-theoretical framework (see Topkis, 1979, Milgrom-Roberts, 1990, or Vives,
1990) in which the most general version of the properties I am describing can
be expressed. Let there be a continuum of agents i ∈ [0, 1], each one being
concerned only with his own action a(i) and with aggregate data, denoted A, a
vector of Rp, on which everybody has only an infinitesimal influence. Each indi-
vidual’s best response depends on the subjective probability distribution of the
aggregate data, denoted p(i) (with p(i) belonging to the set ∆(Rp) of probabil-
ity distributions over the space of aggregate data). In the reduced form version
of the model (see Evans-Guesnerie, 1993, for a general discussion of reduced
forms of this type), agent i ’s best response only depends on the probability
distribution of the aggregate. It is then denoted b(i, p(i)). The aggregate situ-
ation B depends itself on the collection of actions taken by individual agents.
The outcome can be formally written as B(.)=Φ[Πi[b(i, .)]], 6 where Φ is some
aggregation map, so that B is a mapping which associates an aggregate sit-
uation B(P ) ∈ Rp with a profile of individual distributions (each of them is
over Rp) denoted P = Πip(i). When agents have similar point-expectations
on the aggregate state A, the outcome is denoted B(A) where, by abuse of
notation, A denotes the collection of point-expectations (Dirac measures) con-
centrated on A. With these notations, in equilibrium, beliefs on the aggregate
state are self-fulifilling, i.e. A∗ = B(A∗).7 Here, the strategic complementarity
(StCo) assumption means that each individual best response function increases
monotonically in the sense that, given b(i, A), we have b(i,A0) > b(i, A), 8 when-
ever A0 is either a deterministic point-expectation with A0 > A or a stochastic
aggregate with a support S(A0) such that S(A0) > A. In this basic framework,
let us consider the equilibria and the ’rationalizable’ outcomes. We will provide
below some simple examples illustrating this abstract framework.
2.2 The basic StCo framework: equilibria and rationaliz-
able outcomes
A one-dimension basic story
Consider the simplest version of the problem, with a one-dimension aggregate
here denoted a (instead of A in the general version of the model just sketched).
The graph of B(a), which describes the aggregate state of the system as a
function of point expectations a, is increasing (Fig. 1). If B(0) is positive and
6A local approximation of the type B(.)=
R
B(i, .)di is often used in the analysis (Evans-
Guesnerie, 1993, 2003).
7Equilibria in the present framework are ’deterministic’, at least at the aggregate level.
8 Symbol > designates the vector inequality: x > y ⇐⇒ xh ≥ yh ∀h
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Figure 1:
B(+∞) finite, then the number of fixed points {a;B(a) = a}, i.e. of equilibria,
is ’normally’ odd (three in Figure 1).
What was called earlier, in the introduction, the ’eductive’ viewpoint, puts
emphasis on game-theoretical ’rationalizability’ arguments, the logic of which in
the present context is explained in Guesnerie (2002). The ’eductive’ viewpoint
leads here to select the set of rationalizable outcomes. In Figure 1, this set
simply consists of the segment [a1, a3]. The eductive argument sustaining the
conlusion is extremely simple:
- Step 0: From the StCo assumption and the fact that a cannot be negative,
the final state of the system, whatever the individual expectations may be, will
be such that a > B(0). We assume B(0) > 0.
- Step 1: Everybody knowing that a > B(0) (we start using the Common
Knowledge assumption), and given StCo, the final state of the system a will be
such that : a > B ◦B(0) (B ◦B or B2 denotes the second iterate of B).
- Step 2: Everybody taking into account the outcome of step 1 (they know
and know that the others know), the situation will be such that a > B◦B◦B(0).
- The argument goes on, with step n taking into account the conclusion of
step n − 1, and so on. Then, as illustated by Figure 1, the iterative argument
eliminates the whole segment [0, a1[. A symmetric argument, starting from the
CK fact that B(+∞) is finite, eliminates ]a3,+∞[ . Hence, the conclusion.
It is worthwhile noting that, as it is implicit in the ’rationalizability’ con-
struct,9 the argument relies on the fact that the model is CK and that Bayesian
rationality is also CK.
9See Tan and Werlang (1988), who discuss rationalizability à la Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984). Similar analyses apply to dominance solvability à la Luce-Raiﬀa (1957), see
Moulin (1984).
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Figure 2:
A simple one-dimension example
A simple example of a StCo situation, used now and later, has been analyzed
systematically by Chamley (1999, 2004). In this model, agents either join or
do not join. The state of the system is characterized by the mass m of joining
agents (0 ≤ m ≤ 1); the profitability of joining is supposed to be equal to
m. At equilibrium, an agent whose cost c is smaller than m joins. Let F be
the cumulative distribution of costs, associated with density f . If the collective
belief on the mass of joining agents is m, all agents of cost smaller than m, i.e.
F (m) agents, would like to join.
The model displays StCo: the more, the better for everybody. Figure 2, with
the cost parameter on the horizontal axis, shows the graph of the cumulative
distribution. At equilibrium, the cost c of the highest cost joining agent is such
that c = F (c).We now argue that F plays the role of the aggregate best response
function of previous theory. Indeed, there are one (Figure 2a) or three equilibria
(Figure 2b), such that c = F (c).10 Moreover, the rationalizable set follows from
an iterative argument exploiting the same simple intuition as above: The zero-
cost people join anyway;11 the highest-cost people (c higher than one) never
join. This triggers the eductive process: at intermediate levels, agents whose
cost is strictly below c1 join if they believe that all agents below them have
joined; symmetrically, agents whose cost strictly exceeds c3 do not join if they
believe that all agents above them do not join.
A flavor of the general argument
Under StCo, the above line of argument extends to the case where A is
n−dimensional. This is visualized in Figure 3, where A = [a1, a2] is a 2-
dimension aggregate and where the aggregate best response (vector) function
10 It is assumed that F (0) > 0, i.e. there is an ’atom’ of zero-cost agents.
11We assume that some zero-cost people, with a positive global weight though as small as
desired, do join.
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B(a1, a2) is increasing in (a1, a2).
The iterative dominance argument starts by considering the South-West
boundary: (a1, a2) > (0, 0) =⇒ B(a1, a2) > B(0, 0) = A1. Whatever the initial
beliefs of the agents may be, the aggregate state will have coordinates above
those of A1. Next, as in step 1 above, we use the fact that the previous fact is
known. We derive the implication: A > A1 =⇒ B(A) > B(A1) = B ◦ B(0) =
A2. As A1 > 0, StCo implies that B(A1) > B(0), i.e. A2 > A1. But this
new inequality is known by everybody, because it is known that the previous
inequality is known. Pursuing the argument, and using further implications
of the CK assumption, generates an increasing sequence A1, A2, ...An which, if
B(R2+) is bounded from above, converges. Symmetrically, an iterative argument
trigrered by the fact that B(R2+) has an upper bound generates a decreasing
sequence A01, A02, ...A0n which converges.
Hopefully, the argument and its diagrammatic support have made clear the
following key properties of the eductive coordination process leading to the
set of rationalizable outcomes (those that survive the consequences of CK, as
progressively derived in the above iterative process):
- The limit points of the process are equilibria, i.e. they are states such that
A∗ = B(A∗) (this was obvious in the one-dimension case);
- The set of rationalizable outcomes is a product set (here, a square) which
contains all equilibria.
2.3 StCo with incomplete information
It has been repeatedly argued in the literature on StCo that incomplete infor-
mation, i.e. the fact that people do not know exactly the game they are playing,
makes the analysis both more convincing and in a sense neater. This idea orig-
inates in the work of Carlsson-Van Damme (1993) and has been exploited by a
number of authors (see footnote 2). I will introduce the flavor of the argument
by relying on Chamley’s model. The idea has two distinct components.
Incomplete information helps ’buying’ uniqueness of equilibrium
Consider a model in which: (i) each agent observes his true cost; (ii) the
costs are taken from a distribution with a known variance but an unknown
mean, which is taken form a random distribution.12
12One could also consider a variant of this model in which the agents do not know exactly
their cost c (although the distribution of costs is known) but receive a noisy signal s. At a
symmetric equilibrium (which is a priori plausible since every agent uses the same criterion),
the cumulative distribution to be taken into account for the equilibrium analysis is the distri-
bution of signals, that depends on the noise and the objective distribution of costs. The signal
distribution is obtained as a mean preserving spread of the cost distribution. Is it ’flatter’
than the non-noisy distribution of costs? Assume that the noisy signal is symmetric and of
zero mean. The left-side cumulative distribution of the signals will be above that of the costs.
This phenomenon often involves that, in the middle area, the derivative of the cumulative
distribution of signals is smaller than that of the costs. As the equilibria correspond to the
intersections of the cumulative distribution curve with the diagonal, the uniqueness of equi-
librium is somewhat more likely. However the argument remains loose and, in general, is not
suﬃcient to ’buy’ uniqueness.
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Assume that joining is determined by a trigger strategy depending on the
signal received: join if c < c, do not join if not. In these conditions, the mass
of agents whose cost is smaller than yours is a random variable, whose mean
is a function of the observed cost. Such a function is the cumulative of a new
distribution which, under a normality hypothesis on the two underlying distri-
butions, has a higher variance than the initial distribution of costs (Chamley,
2004, chapter 11-2). This property is not generally suﬃcient to conclude to
uniqueness. However, if the distribution of costs, conditional on the mean, is
symmetric and close to a Dirac measure, everybody thinks that a proportion
close to 1/2 has received a signal lower than his own signal, therefore the rele-
vant distribution is almost flat, and a flat enough distribution involves a unique
equilibrium.
Incomplete information does not preclude iterative elimination
Take the last version of Chamley’s model. It is a dominant strategy to join
if your cost is very low. Assume that all agents who have received a (true) cost
signal less than c have joined, and that their expected mass is F (c) > c. If,
being risk neutral, you receive c or c+e, e being very small, you still join. But if
e is not very small, and even if c+ e > F (c), you will rationally infer from your
signal c + e that the mass of people who have received a signal smaller than c
is smaller than F (c) (because your subjective evaluation of the actual mean is
below the evaluation of somebody who has received the signal c). Therefore, the
profitability of joining, as considered in the mental process of elimination (under
the assumption that everybody below c has joined) will not stay as flat as in
Figure 1, but will drop more quickly as suggested in Figure 3. The process will
still be convergent, although in longer virtual time (see Chamley, 2004, Figure
11-7).
3 Strategic Substitutabilities
3.1 A one-dimension view of StSu
Let us come back to the one-dimension version of the model of section 2.2,
but assume that B satisfies the property dB/da < 0, as in Figure 5: We have
strategic substitutabilities. The Muthian model, considered in Guesnerie (1988,
1992) for assessing expectational coordination in a partial equilibrium context,
provides such an example of one-dimension strategic substituabilities. Let the
variable a denote the size of the crop. As the price P (a) decreases with a, the
size B(a) of the supplied crop, associated with expectations a, decreases with
a. There is a unique equilibrium that can be ’educed’ through arguments of the
following type: If some farmers with high costs do not join, then the crop has a
maximal size for which the price is rather low, but not so low as to prevent a few
eﬃcient enough farmers to be willing to plant their land (the argument is the
8
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Figure 3:
same as in step one of the previous argument). But, when only these low-cost
farmers participate, the size of the crop is such that the price will be lower than
some (high) treshold. As a consequence, some farmers, who a priori would have
liked to join initially, drop. Therefore, the price will be higher than assumed
in the previous step, so that more low-cost farmers will join, etc. The process
is described more formally in Guesnerie (1992) and its steps are illustrated in
Figure 4.
Let us reformulate the model in order to make it directly comparable to the
above StCo cost model: Each farmer produces only one unit at cost c. I denote
B(u) the mass of farmers that produce if they expect that the mass of active
farmers is u. Clearly, B(u) = F (P (u)), where F is the cumulative distribution
of costs; B(u) is also the mass of farmers who want to produce if all the farmers
of cost smaller than u, and only them, do produce. It is left to the reader to
rewrite the just sketched ’eductive’ argument in the modified setting. The reader
will also verify that the analysis (either the equilibrium analysis or the ’eductive’
one) is not basically modified in the presence of risk, with risk neutral farmers
(u being a signal, define B(u) as B(u) = F (E(P (u))), where E designates the
expectation operator.
Note that, in this model:
- Equilibrium is unique.
- When the eductive process can be started (this condition may require some
hypothesis on CK at the boundary), the set of rationalizable equilibria generally
consists of a segment [u1, u2] such that u1 = B(u2), u2 = B(u1), i.e. its limits
are a 2-cycle of B.
- The unique equilibrium is globally eductively stable if B has no cycle. It
is locally eductively stable iﬀ |dB/du(u)| = |F 0(P 0(u)| < 1, i.e. if the price
9
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Figure 4:
elasticity of aggregate supply is smaller than the price elasticity of aggregate
demand.
3.2 The n-dimension version of the story
Figure 6 visualizes the two-dimension counterpart of Figure 2 when StSu re-
places StCo. Now B(a1, a2) is (coordinate by coordinate) decreasing in [a1, a2].
We also have B(a1, a2) < B(A0) if A0 is any distribution the support of which
is ’above’ [a1, a2], and B(a1, a2) > B(A0) if A0 is any distribution the support
of which is ’below’ [a1, a2].13
- Assume that B(0) = A01 and (this is not entirely innocuous) A1= B(A
0
1) >
0. The iterative dominance argument can be started, at the North-East bound-
ary, whenever it is CK that (a1, a2) < A01. This implies B(a1, a2) > B(A01) =
A1, where A1 is as in Figure 6.
- As in step 1 above, the CK belief A > A1 implies that B(A) < ΛB(A1) =
B ◦B(A01) = A02.
- Suppose (that is indeed an assumption) that A02 < A01. Pursuing the argu-
ment generates both an decreasing sequence A01, A
0
2, ..., A
0
n such that A
0
n = B ◦
B(A0n−1) and an increasing sequence A1, A2, ..., An such that An = B◦B(An−1).
The procedure suggests the following key properties of the eductive coordi-
nation process leading to the set of rationalizable equilibria:
13 ’above’, in the sense that the support belongs to [a1, a2] +R2+, ’below’ when the support
belongs to [a1, a2]−R2+
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Figure 5:
- The set of rationalizable outcomes is a product set (at least, under the
assumptions introduced in the above argument).
- This set contains all equilibria.14 As in the one-dimension case, the limit
points of the processes are cycles of order 2 of B: they are not equilibria, unless
they coincide.
4 Comparing worlds: StCo versus StSu
We are now in a position to assess the somewhat striking diﬀerences in the
conditions of expectational coordination in the polar contexts of StCo and StSu.
We first consider the complete information case, in which our theory is rather
general.
4.1 Key diﬀerences and implications
Main insights from the complete information model
The results obtained in the complete information framework sustain diﬀerent
views on expectational coordination.
Under StCo, uniqueness is not guaranteed but uniqueness implies the success
of the elimination process. In my terminology, a unique equilibrium is ’strongly
rational’ (Guesnerie, 1992) or ’eductively stable’ (Evans-Guesnerie, 1993). And
stability is global (in case of mutiplicity, local eductive stability may however
obtain: it is the case for the extreme two equilibria of Figure 1). In short,
14 In the one-dimension model, uniqueness obtains, but not necessarily in this 2-dimension
version of the model.
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uniqueness is the Graal: the unique equilibrium is a focal point which is fur-
thermore singled out by the eductive mental process. Rational expectations are
not, as some initial enthusiasts argued, the consequence of the rationality hy-
pothesis. But they follow from the Common Knowledge of both the model and
rationality.
Under StSu, uniqueness is still obtained in the one-dimension case, but it
does not necessarily hold in the n-dimension version of the model. But unique-
ness does not solve the expectational coordination problem neatly: the equilib-
rium may not be globally eductively stable or ’strongly rational’; the convergence
property may not even hold locally (in the sense that no hypothetical CK con-
jecture that restricts the outcome of the situation to a close neighbourhood of
the equilibrium may exist, so that there is no way to trigger, even locally, the
mental process towards the equilibrium, see Guesnerie (2002)). For example, in
the Muth model, local eductive stability requires that supply is less elastic than
demand.
If one considers that the case for expectational coordination is serious when-
ever the equilibrium under consideration is locally eductively stable (which I
tend to believe), uniqueness is neither a suﬃcient condition nor a necessary one
for creating favourable conditions to ’expectational coordination’.
In a sense, the views suggested by the analysis of StSu models are embar-
rassing to the dominant intellectual sensitivity of the profession that adheres to
the precepts of philosophical determinism, according to which the ideal of scien-
tificity is a univoque prediction. The strong rationality criterion advocated here
is at variance with such a view. The criterion may reject a unique equilibrium
and, in the presence of several equilibria, it may pick none, one or several of
them!15
Mixed worlds
Let me now stress, although this point is rarely noted, that the opposition
just raised between the orderly world of StCo and the anarchist outside world
is not as clear cut as suggested above. The reason is that StCo in the aggre-
gate may coexist with some elements of StSu at the micro-level. Let us adopt
the notation of footnote 5, i.e. B (.) =
R
B (i, .), but assume dB/da > 0 (this
amounts to saying that
R
[dB(i, .)/da]di > 0 does not rule out dB(i, a)/da < 0
for a subset ISS). In this mixed world, uniqueness obtains when the aggre-
gate reaction is flat enough. But, now, even uniqueness does not buy ’eductive
stability’: Indeed, the argument developed in Evans-Guesnerie (1993) and the
posterior discussion in Guesnerie (2002), show that local ’eductive stability’ re-
quires
R
ISS
[−dB(i, a)/da]di+
R
I\ISS [dB(i, a)}di < 1. Pessimism in ISS combined
with optimism in INSS may perturb considerably the coordination of beliefs.16
This example leads us to wonder if there is any basis for the Graal!
15 In terms of the metaphor sketched in the introduction, the highway displays an orderly
landscape, the mountain trail is synomym of disorder.
16This is likely to have consequences for the model of crisis à la Morris-Shin, where the
homogeneity of agents, in the expectatioanl terms introduced here, is doubtful.
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4.2 The case of incomplete information
Up to now, complete information has been assumed. To examine the case of
incomplete information, let us return to the above version of the Muth problem,
but suppose now that the agents have a known cost drawn from an unknown
distribution. Under the same assumptions as above, the relevant distribution
of costs for the analysis has a higher variance than the actual distribution of
costs. Naturally, as uniqueness still holds, a flatter distribution of costs does
not make the equilibrium more unique. Does it make it more eductively stable?
Consider the limit case where the mean of the distribution is unknown but the
distribution of costs very concentrated (remind this is the favourable case for
eductive stability in the presence of StCo). Is it still true that, if they know that
some high-cost agents drop, some low-cost agents are induced to join, so that
other high-cost agents may drop? It is certainly true that a Bayesian rational
agent receiving his cost signal will believe that about half of the agents have
received a higher signal. But the hypothesis, similar to the one used in the
triggering argument of the StCo iterative process, that all agents with higher
cost signals have dropped, has no much grasp on the other agents’ actions, in
the present case. Assume indeed that high-cost agents (i.e., above some cut-
oﬀ cost c) drop. Because you believe that the distribution of costs is highly
concentrated, you can only infer, if you have, say, average cost (and, a fortiori,
if you are a low-cost agent), that only a small number of high-cost people will
drop: then only a small number of lower-cost agents are induced to join. This
is the first iterate of process depicted by the dotted curve of Figure 6. The
process goes on: knowing the first part of the argument, high-costs agents will
know that only very-low-cost agents join under the initial conjecture; but they
rationally believe that a very small number of low cost agents are induced to
join, and this weakens the rationale for the initial drop decision (as suggested
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by the upper dotted curve). This makes reasonably clear why the equilibrium
will not be eductively stable.17 Note that the graphical argument that extends
the one used in the StCo case suggests a rather general ”destabilizing” role for
incomplete information!
The conclusion is: The circumstances in which incomplete information gen-
erates the Graal (uniqueness plus eductive stabilty) do not contribute to de-
stroying uniqueness but tend to destroy eductive stability.18
5 Is macroeconomics dominated by StCo or StSu?
The question that arises from the previous analysis is the plausibility of StCo in
economic analysis. I do not deny that the topics studied in the StCo literature
(crisis, agglomeration) are relevant. However, in the field of macroeconomics,
where the StCo tools have been seen as potentially useful by some authors, the
case is disputable. Let me indeed consider a set of macroeconomic models for
which the StCo apparatus seems relevant (they are aggregate models in which
the role of StCo is a priori magnified, thus having a Keynesian flavour). I want
to argue that, for these models, StSu are likely to dominate StCo, even if the
analysis will also point out to ’remains’ of StCo.
5.1 One-dimensionmacroeconomics with Keynesian flavour
It has been argued that macroeconomic situations give rise to strategic com-
plementarities. The argument goes back at least to Diamond (1982): in his
model, trade results from random meetings and trade frequency increases with
the number of active participants (this is the source of standard StCo). The in-
centive to participate increases with the number of active participants, therefore
the corresponding diagram is similar to the one of Figure 1 or 2, with one or
several equilibria. However, this story leaves in the shadow some key features of
exchange such as price competition.19 In order to stress the limits of the StCo
story in a macroeconomic context, let us take a variant of the model I have
investigated in Guesnerie (2001a).
Let there be a large number of firms, each one producing one unit of good, so
that, in the limit, total production is Q =
R
I di, the integral being taken on the
set of active firms I. But firms are more or less productive, so that firm i needs
to hire θ(i) workers (in other words, its cost is c(i) = θ(i)w, where w is the wage).
All firms have to decide on production, in the morning of the first day. Income
in the afternoon is pQ +M,20 where M is the money held. If the afternoon
17S. Morris found this argument striking, but has developed a formal calculation with H.
Shin, in one of the models they previously studied (personal correspondence). These calcula-
tions clearly support the above analysis. Our analysis has not the status of a formal proof
but is likely to provide the basic ingredients for it.
18Walking on the mountain trail requires a behaviour at odds with driving on the highway...
19Although the specific story told by Diamond make the price issue actually irrelevant.
20 I assume rather unrealistically that agents receive not only wage income but also the
ex-post realized profit. This simplifies the algebra without changing the conclusions.
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price p and the morning wage w are fixed, all firms i ∈ I(p) such that θ(i)w < p
would like to produce. However, eﬀective demand is D(p, pQ +M), notional
supply is Q =
R
I(p) di, and supply is supposed to exceed demand when p is large
(a ’Keynesian’ situation). In that case there is rationing, assumed to be such
that the most eﬃcient firms remain in operation. Hence, there is a relationship
between the expected production Qe and the actual production D(p, pQe+M).
At equilibrium Q∗ = D(p, pQ∗ +M). We are in a somewhat standard StCo
case: actual production increases with anticipated production and the slope of
the function is p(∂D/∂R), i.e. the marginal propensity to consume π governs
the speed of the eductive process. An exogenous shock of 1 on demand would
push production by 1/(1− π), the standard Keynesian multiplier. There is no
doubt that this type of Keynesian macroeconomics enters the class of standard
one-dimension StCo models.
However, assume now, as in my paper (Guesnerie, 2001a), that the after-
noon price is the market clearing price. The model remains Keynesian, with the
morning wage fixed at a level that generates an excess supply of labour. How-
ever, the equilibrium price ψ(Q) satisfies Q = D(ψ(Q), ψ(Q)Q+M), so that21
ψ0(Q) = (∂DC)/(1 − π(Q)) where ∂DC is a ’compensated elasticity’ of price
demand and π(Q) is the marginal propensity to consume, calculated at the
point (ψ(Q), ψ(Q)Q+M). The (Keynesian ?) fixed wage equilibrium Q∗ satis-
fies S(ψ(Q∗)) = D(ψ(Q∗), ψ(Q∗)Q∗+M) where S is the ’notional’ competitive
supply.
The point to be stressed is that the limited-price-flexibility hypothesis has
led us away from the StCo world. Indeed, the model under consideration dis-
plays strategic substitutabilities. Hence, it has a unique equilibrium which turns
out to be locally eductively stable whenever (S0/D0)∗ < m∗ where S0/D0 is, as
in the Muth model, the ratio of supply over demand elasticities, and m∗ is the
Keynesian mutiplier (all evaluated at equilibrium). The set of rationalizable
equilibria is included in the segment (ψ(Q0),Q0), where Q0 is the full employ-
ment activity level, and only in good cases may coincide with the equilibrium...
And there is no clear sense in which incomplete information would make things
better.22
Introducing now wage flexibility in the morning brings us back to a Wal-
rasian setting closer to the presently standard macroeconomic models, and fur-
ther away from the StCo world of fully fixed price models. In the simplest
setting considered in section 5 of Guesnerie (2001a), equilibrium is unique and,
in a sense, ’often’ eductively stable: the reason is that wage flexibility guaran-
tees full employment and this is a powerful anchor to expectation coordination.
Still, the set of rationalizable equilibria is not always reduced to the Walrasian
equilibrium. It may happen, for example, that low-cost firms (those whose cost
is smaller than the Walrasian cut-oﬀ cost) do not produce and are replaced by
less eﬃcient firms (those whose cost exceeds the Walrasian cut-oﬀ cost). These
latter firms are optimistic in the sense they expect a price higher than the Wal-
21This is a simple computation left to the reader who will check that ∂Dc = ∂D+Q∂D/∂R.
22 StSu may even worsen the result.
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rasian price; however, since they are less eﬃcient than the Walrasian firms,
the market-clearing wage will be mechanically higher than the Walrasian wage.
However, the expectations associated with this situation are rationalizable in
the following sense: price expectations of the most eﬃcient firms (the produc-
ing firms at the Walrasian equilibrium) coincide with the Walrasian price and,
both in the intuitive sense and in the formal sense, this is ’rationalizable’, even
if it induces some of them to drop at the actual market-clearing wage. The price
expectations of the optimistic firms are also rationalizable, for the simple reason
that the price they expect does finally prevail! The fact that this price is above
the Walrasian price is due to the lower productivity of these firms, which also
leads to a lower actual production.
Can we conclude that the StCo story is entireley irrelevant when one leaves
the fully rigid price world? In fact, strategic complementarities associated with
income eﬀects generated by increased economic activity are still present in the
two models I have briefly presented. Although they are dominated by strategic
substitutabilities, strategic complementarities alleviate strategic substitutabil-
ities and play a positive role in improving expectational coordination. This is
illustrated by the role of the Keynesian multiplier in the local eductive stabil-
ity of the equilibrium: roughly speaking, as suggested by the above formula, a
higher Keynesian multiplier makes eductive stability more plausible. In a more
surprising way, the Keynesian multiplier turns out to be an ingredient of some
conditions that are suﬃcient for eductive stability of the Walrasian equilibrium
(formula (4-13) in Guesnerie (2001a)): The intuitive explanation is that a high
Keynesian multiplier favours the expectational stability of the Walrasian equi-
librium!
To sum up, the basic insights of the standard StCo models disappear, but
with significant remains of the StCo story. The next subsection attempts to
evaluate the importance of these remains.
5.2 n-dimension world: the remains of StCo in macroeco-
nomics?
In a loose sense, the previous analysis suggests that strategic complementarities,
although they are dominated by StSu (outside the extreme polar world we first
considered) still coexist with them and alleviate StSu in a sense favourable to
expectational coordination, even in a fully Walrasian world.23 However, the level
of aggregation of the model leaves a doubt on the robustness of the analysis:
are the ’remains’ of StCo an artefact due to the aggregation of the model?
In order to examine this question, I have considered in Guesnerie (2001b),
an n−dimension (’Keynesian’) version of the three-goods model of the previous
subsection. There is a market clearing price for each of these goods, but the
morning wage is fixed at a ’Keynesian’ level. Now, local eductive stability
of the equilibrium is obtained whenever the eigenvalue of highest modulus of
23Note, however, that when going towards a world closer to the RBC-like model, the mul-
tiplier we have pointed at would become smaller, as a result of the decrease of the marginal
propensity to consume present income, if a life-cycle model of consumption is adopted.
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the matrix {(∂S)(∂Z)−1(I − A)} is smaller than 1, where ∂S is the Jacobian
matrix of supply (as a function of prices), (∂Z)−1 is the inverse of the Jacobian
matrix of demand, and A is the matrix of marginal propensities to consume.
The reader will note that this formula generalizes the previous one-dimension
condition. Is it the case that a ’bigger’ matrix A might improve expectational
coordination? In that case, there are unambiguous StCo remains in the problem:
higher propensities to consume, i.e. a higher (Keynesian-like) income multiplier,
would be, in a reasonable sense, good for expectational coordination. Such a
positive answer can only be given when Z satisfies the gross substitutability
hypothesis. This is the case where the ’remains’ of the StCo intuitions, with
the positive role of income eﬀects they stress, are significant and identifiable.
In the general case, the intuition drawn from the StCo approach is diﬃcult to
disentangle from the other aspects of the problem.
6 Conclusion
This paper has made, hopefully convincingly, three main points:
- It has compared and opposed two analyses of expectational coordination.
In the StCo paradigm, a neat route consists in searching for uniqueness. In
the opposite polar framework (StSu), global or even local stability involves a
variety of tools and approaches. However, StSu is a more relevant framework
for economic analysis.
- It has suggested that the interplay of StCo and incomplete information
opens only a rather tiny territory of reflection. In particular, incomplete infor-
mation does not seem to facilitate the analysis of expectational coordination in
StSu situations.
- It has finally argued, from the examination of a class of models, that the
StCo paradigm is likely to account for a very limited set of phenomena in the field
of macroeconomics. However, even when StCo are dominated by StSu, detecting
the ’remains’ of StCo may help understanding expectational coordination.
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